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ABSTRACT
The coordination of communication and awareness efforts in the process of Information Security
Incident Management (ISIM) has been identified as a critical means of enhancing information security
protection in organizations. This paper aims to explore the nuances of organizational information
security with respect to the coordination of communication and awareness efforts among organizational
stakeholders towards achieving a shared, interactive, and participatory ISIM. According to the findings
of the study in the organizations sampled, it has been identified that reporting, communication, and
awareness efforts within ISIM were found to be largely uncoordinated. The exploratory findings
provided a rationale for the proposal of a conceptual model. The model would unify and subsume
situational awareness and interactive modes of communication toward improving the coordination of
awareness and communication efforts among stakeholders in the management of information security
incidents.
Keywords
Information Security, Incident Management, Situational Awareness, Incident Reporting, Interactive
Model of Communication.
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INTRODUCTION
The contemporary large-scale interconnection of computers and cyber-data exchanged globally has
created an enormous threat to organizations in safeguarding information security, and the proliferation
of cyber security incidents is rife. Threats can come both externally and internally (i.e., from insiders)
(Syahrial et al., 2019). A report on 86 global companies commissioned by IBM Security (2019) found
that malicious cyber-attacks surged to 51% in 2019, and the longer an organization takes to contain and
manage a threat, the more prohibitively expensive it becomes. Moreover, lengthy downtimes can cause
reputational risks to an organization (Metzger et al., 2011). The study also found that the time taken to
contain incidents has grown by 4.9% and that the cost of breaches that were not contained within 200
days rose to $4.56 million. Therefore, uncoordinated and unsupported management of information
security incidents has created significant concern among organizations irrespective of their scope,
mission, setting, or type (Ahmad et al., 2012; Johnson, 2006).
Nyman and Große (2019) purport that the high levels of information security incidents demand a
formalized incident management process and call for more empirical research to be conducted to guide
information security incident management in practice. Ab Rahman and Choo (2015) reason that while
incident management is a mature field, there is a lack of consistency with respect to describing incident
management and response in the literature. They found that less than 10% of the research conducted
involves incident reporting and prioritization (2010-2015). Yohannes et al. (2019) conducted a case
study on a financial institution in Ethiopia from an information security incident management
perspective in response to the dearth of studies in this context. They found the lack of standardized
processes and issues of collaboration, communication, and awareness to be problematic and argued for
more studies to be conducted within various organizations in Ethiopia. Consequently, the aim of this
study is to explore nuances of organizational information security with respect to the coordination of
communication and awareness efforts among organizational stakeholders towards achieving a shared,
interactive, and participatory Information Security Incident Management (ISIM) process. This prompted
the following research question (RQ): How do organizations effectively coordinate communication and
awareness efforts in ISIM? The minor research questions that guided the study are: (1) How do
organizations integrate communication and awareness efforts into their ISIM policies and practices? (2)
To what extent is the integration and stakeholder participation implemented in the process of incident
communication and awareness efforts within ISIM processes? and (3) How can organizations enhance
the coordination of communication and awareness efforts within the processes of ISIM practice?
ISIM strives to address technical issues such as inquiry, containment, and recovery. It aims at preventing
incidents from a management perspective in which planning, detection, reporting, assessment, response,
and lessons learned are crucial processes of ISIM (Tøndel et al., 2014). The effective coordination of
awareness and communication strategies within ISIM can contribute greatly in mitigating existing and
future incidents (ISO/IEC 27035-1:2011, 2011). There have been calls for more studies to explore why
ISIM is so challenging (Tøndel et al., 2014). Some of the challenges include lack of documentation, lack
of training, lack of planning, misunderstandings between security and control personnel, lack of postincident evaluations, and the difference of priorities and perspectives between managers and technical
personnel (Bartnes et al., 2016b). Some other challenges include gaining senior management
commitment, involving all employees, the usability issues of technical tools, incident registration, and
collaboration (Line & Albrechtsen, 2016).
The management of information security incidents is indeed challenging, as it involves both technical
and social aspects (Ahmad et al., 2012). As a result, an integrated approach encompassing human,
organizational, technical, and behavioral factors to information security is crucial to containing
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information security threats in a coordinated way. Although some organizations have been utilizing
some standards of ISIM, the need to integrate communication and awareness schemes is not well
understood and thus inhibits proactive ISIM. Bartnes et al. (2016b) maintain that there is a need for
further research that details how communication and collaboration among stakeholders within ISIM
occurs in practice. Similarly, Ahmad et al. (2015) argue that there is a paucity of research that considers
how the experiences of incident response teams can be used towards improving security processes, and
most studies focus on the response part of the process and do not consider the “lessons learned” aspect.
Clearly, the lessons learned from previous incidents can be useful only if there is an effective
coordination of communication and awareness efforts. This study will explore how communication and
awareness efforts are coordinated in practice within several Ethiopian organizations. This will assist in
documenting the experiences of ISIM which will be used as a rationale towards developing a conceptual
model as an ancillary aim.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: the second and third sections explicate the related
works and the research methodology, respectively. The fourth and fifth sections provide an analysis of
the findings and the discussion of the findings, correspondingly. The sixth section presents the
conceptual model. The study limitations, contribution to knowledge, and areas of further research
conclude the paper.
LITERATURE REVIEW
An information security incident is defined as “a single or a series of unwanted or unexpected
information security events that have a significant probability of compromising business operations and
threatening information security” (ISO/ IEC 27035:2016, 2016). The goals and activities of ISIM
processes are to neutralize the incidents while reducing the damages (Ani & Agbanusi, 2014). Ani and
Agbanusi (2014), who conducted a systematic overview of the various frameworks proposed towards
ISIM, identified the following similarities among the various approaches:
•

Preparation – organizational readiness for incidents which involve training, policies, preventative
security mechanisms (e.g. firewalls, backup and recovery software, logs), and a well-defined
plan.

•

Detection – a system for reporting incidents.

•

Formulation of response strategy/planning – identifying the most suitable approach for handling
the incident via analysis and collaborating with appropriate stakeholders.

•

Containment/preservation – development of a strategy to prevent further damage to the system,
such as disabling services.

•

Eradication – a long-term solution to eliminating the threat; for example, a policy update.

•

Recovery – restoring the system back to normal working order.

•

Lesson Learned/Reporting/Follow-Up and Incident Closure – learning from the incident to
prevent future similar incidents.
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Figure 1. Information Security Incident Management Event Flow Diagram
(adapted from [ISO/IEC 27035-1:2011, 2011])

The ISO/IEC 27035 standard, which is the most recognized organizational security standard (Tøndel et
al., 2014), covers the processes for handling information security incidents and vulnerabilities. As
depicted in Figure 1, the process of managing an information security incident follows a cyclic process –
plan and prepare; detect and report; assess and decide; respond (prevent, reduce, recover); and lessons
learned. These steps involve planning by policy and having the right people to manage the incident,
identifying and reporting the incident, assessing the incident and making decisions as to how the
incident is to be resolved, responding to incidents by containing and resolving them, and learning from
the incident in order to be better prepared for future incidents (ISO/ IEC 27035:2016, 2016). Other
frameworks include COBIT (Control Objectives for Information and Related Technologies) (ISACA,
2012) and ITIL (Information Technology Infrastructure Library) (Taylor et al., 2007), and NIST
(National Institute of Standards and Technology) (Cichonski et al., 2012). The NIST guideline
(comparable to the ISO/IEC standard) is also popular – it contains the phases of preparation, detection
and analysis, containment, eradication and recovery, and post-incident activity (Tøndel et al., 2014).
Most studies that consider ISIM in practice share several commonalities. Hove et al. (2014) conducted a
study on ISIM practices in three large organizations in Norway. From this study, two major issues
related to the coordination of awareness and communication efforts were identified. Employees did not
know how to report an incident and thus the tacit knowledge of users was being overlooked. Users can
be valuable sources of information. Distributed structures hindered the collection and dissemination of
incident-related information. The lack of coordination is evidenced by the lack of assigned
responsibility. Clearly, one needs to know how to communicate the ’right information” to the “right
people” to avoid leaking sensitive information.
Studies show that ISIM is largely uncoordinated. Ahmad et al. (2015) conducted a case study based on
the Australian financial sector. They found that there are no formal structures to facilitate the “lessons
learned” component. This implies that past incidents do not inform the management of new incidents.
Bartnes et al. (2016b) conducted a study on current ISIM practices of Norwegian electric power
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organizations. They found that the coordination of ISIM has not improved, as various views persist. In
addition, organizations do not accord a high level of priority to ISIM. Line (2013) conducted a
preliminary study that overviewed current ISIM practices in power industries. It was found that the
process was unsystematic and there was a lack of coordination among the various groups of staff.
Yohannes et al. (2019) found that in their case study of an Ethiopian bank that there was no formalized
information security incident management, even though the bank was compliant with ITIL and ISO
standards. They found that while there was an automated system of detection, issues, such as
collaborative work, incident reporting, awareness, manual detection systems, post incident sharing of
experiences and rehearsals were not given due consideration. They found that the lack of awareness,
lack of skills, the lack of collaboration, and the communication gaps were causative challenges. Jaatun et
al. (2009), who conducted interviews (n = 9) regarding information security incident management
processes in the Norwegian petroleum industry, also cited challenges with awareness and reporting.
Several suggestions have been proposed to deal with the challenges identified in ISIM. Line et al. (2014)
conducted an interview study on ISIM and concluded that there should be a unified approach to ISIM.
Similarly, Jaatun et al. (2009) reasoned that there is a need to develop a reporting culture to unify ISIM.
They propose enhancing the capability of incident management communication, underscoring
organizational learning and individual training to resolve the communication gap among staff in order to
unify the risk and situational understanding. They suggest an approach to learning from incidents that is
both proactive and reactive, as the organization can learn about real time incidents and previous
incidents, emphasizing organizational learning (Jaatun et al., 2009).
Several approaches have been proposed to manage ISIM. Metzger et al. (2011) developed a holistic,
process-oriented approach to ISIM where incident response teams can correlate several incidents across
multiple channels, which helps in classifying incidents correctly and, depending on the incident, an
automated or manual reaction can be triggered. This method combined all reporting channels for
consistency. Despite the successful implementation of the model, they found they needed to support the
various ways incidents get reported. Furthermore, some incidents are not reported at all, or due to the
lack of awareness, users are unable to report incidents correctly. Jeong et al. (2008) proposed an interorganizational model for organizations that find it difficult to support a security team. Their model
involves outsourcing their security information with a coordinator organization that can detect and
analyze incidents for the organization. However, this model has not been implemented, as it merely
transfers the challenges to another partner organization. Imamverdiyev (2013) considered the problem
of prioritizing the volumes of incidents using fuzzy analytics. This can be a technical solution to
managing incidents; however, it does not address the socio-technical challenges highlighted by extant
studies. Baskerville et al. (2014) developed a framework that strikes a balance between prevention (i.e.,
managing predicted threats) and information security response (i.e., managing unpredicted threats)
which encompasses three elements, namely, situational analysis, planning, and operation in both the
prevention paradigm and response paradigm, with a careful balance between the two. An advantage of
the model is that it prioritizes incident management, as it places the “lessons learned: as part of the
central mode between prevention and response; however, it does not address the awareness and
communication efforts required in ISIM.
The coordination of tasks within the security incident response process is highly complex, as it involves
assigning responsibilities, duties, and tasks in a well-defined manner so that the correct workflows are
triggered to manage incidents (Metzger et al., 2011). This coordination is often marred by poor
communication and awareness efforts. Although awareness, training, and updating relevant databases
and sharing results with trusted communities are key elements of the ISO/IEC 27035 standard,
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unsatisfactory collaboration and poor communication efforts appear to be rife in ISIM (Tøndel et al.,
2014). Evidently, organizations should be proactive in building the knowledge base of their
stakeholders. Stakeholders (internal or external) may be a potential threat on occasion or the weakest
information link (Johnson, 2006). It is evident that the management of incidents requires dynamism and
coordination of work, and it requires collaboration from personnel of various perspectives to solve often
complex problems (Bartnes et al., 2016b). Consequently, the aim of this study is to understand how
organizations coordinate communication and awareness efforts in ISIM as a rationale towards proposing
a conceptual model to address these challenges revealed in the study.
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
The main aim of this study is to understand how organizations coordinate awareness and communication
efforts in ISIM. This research study adopted an exploratory approach in order to achieve this aim. This
methodology is suitable in studies where the problem is not well-defined. Typically, exploratory
research is largely emergent and does not subscribe to a specific paradigm (Munkvold & Bygstad,
2016). Exploratory research can be a pathway into gaining insight into the research methodology to be
used in the next phase of the research (Chawla & Sodhi, 2011). As this type of research is characterized
by flexibility, pragmatism, and continuous discovery (Jupp, 2006), it is difficult to subscribe to a
quantitative or qualitative research design. While the objective to identify patterns suggests a
quantitative orientation, the social interactions with the participants suggest a qualitative orientation
(Ang, 2014). There has been a recent trend towards “generic qualitative studies” which do not subscribe
to the typical prescribed methodologies that guide interpretive research (i.e., narrative,
phenomenological, grounded theory, ethnographic, and case study) (Caelli et al., 2003). Reiter (2013)
also reflects on this trend relative to exploratory research and argues that exploratory research is
entrenched in a socially constructed view of reality, as the aim is to produce new and insightful ways to
explain reality and not to develop new facts. Furthermore, Reiter (2013) suggests that a researcher
cannot be neutral, as in the positivistic tradition; however, rigor can be achieved by being honest and
transparent with respect to the researcher’s framing. Therefore, it is important to clarify the
epistemological and ontological position of the researcher in an exploratory study.
Oates (2005, p. 292) suggests that an interpretive research paradigm “deals with the social context of an
information system; the social processes by which it is developed and constructed by people through
which it influences, and is influenced by its social setting.” Therefore, an interpretive lens allows for
understanding of failures that may be unknown to even those who are immersed in ISIM (Saunders et
al., 2019). Consequently, the ontological position is relativist, assuming multiple constructed realities,
while the epistemological viewpoint (i.e., the “relationship between the ‘knower’ [the research
participant] and the ‘would-be knower’ [the researcher]”) is within the interpretivist tradition which
advocates for a subjectivist stance (Ponterotto, 2005, p. 131). However, given the exploratory nature of
this study, a less prescriptive approach was taken, with the aim of obtaining a descriptive picture of the
research questions posed as a rationale for the development of an applicable and compatible conceptual
model to the problems raised. The authors were oriented towards a positivistic stance in terms of
identifying patterns in the data, as this substantiated the development of the conceptual model.
In this study, a semi-structured interview guide (see Appendix A) was selected as an option for data
collection. A semi-structured interview is useful in exploratory research, as it can help to clarify and
discover concepts (Bless et al., 2006). The interview guide combined quantitative and qualitative
questions to allow for interpretive reflections. This research employed a :track bound” approach, as the
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interview guide is based on various extant sources as building blocks (Sandberg & Alvesson, 2011),
including the ISO/IEC 27035-1:2011 (2011) standard.
The interview guide consisted of two parts. Part I was intended for the information security experts only
while Part II (which was self-developed) was intended for end-users. Part I consists of three sections.
Section 1 was designed to obtain background information of the organization. Sections 2 and 3 were
designed to understand the coordination of awareness and communication efforts among security and
end-user personnel respectively. Table 1 shows the derivation of the interview guide per question.
Component
Background

Question
1.1-1.1.17

Roles and Responsibilities
Application of Standards
Formal Agreements
ISIM Processes

2.1, 2.2, 2.3 and 2.4
2.5, 2.6 and 2.7
2.8. and 2.9
2.10

Awareness Levels
Workflows
Awareness Efforts
Communication Efforts
Communication Experience
Improvement Strategies
Challenges
End-User Involvement

2.11
2.12 and 2.13
2.14
2.15, 2.17, 2.18
2.16
2.19 and 2.21
2.20
3.1, 3.2, 3.3, 3.4 and 3.5

Reference
Wooding et al. (2003); Da Veiga and Eloff (2007); Caballero
(2013)
Bernsmed and Tøndel (2013)
Ab Rahman and Choo (2015); Tøndel et al. (2014)
Johnson (2006)
Ahmed et al. (2012); Bernsmed and Tøndel (2013); Dodson
(2001); Kossakowski et al. (1999); and Werlinger et al. (2010)
Bernsmed and Tøndel (2013)
Belsis et al. (2005)
Johnson (2006)
Baker (2002); Dodson (2001); and Wood (2012)
Werlinger et al. (2010)
Self-Developed Open-Ended Questions
Self-Developed Open-Ended Question
Johnson (2006)

Table 1. The Questionnaire Items Categorized into Components

A pilot test was conducted among information security experts (n = 6) from each of the organizations
involved in the study to assess the content validity of the interview guide. A purposive sampling strategy
was designed to meet the following criteria – engagement with large data sets, vulnerability to security
incidents, engagement in ISIM processes, and proximity to the researcher.
Validity in qualitative type studies is confirmed by four basic tests – credibility (i.e., did the researcher
accurately portray the participants’ perceptions), dependability (i.e., coherence of the methods used),
transferability (i.e., the extent to which the “working hypothesis” can be transferred to another context,
and confirmability (i.e., the extent to which the data can be confirmed by others) (Bradley, 1993). (Note:
Lincoln and Guba [1986] provided a baseline of techniques to achieve validity in qualitative studies
which correspond to the criteria used by positivists). Credibility was achieved by the following
techniques: prolonged engagement, triangulation, peer debriefing, and member checking. The field work
was conducted over a period of six months. Peer debriefing was achieved by submitting the data and
analysis to the secondary researcher for verification. The triangulation of data collection techniques was
used as a mechanism of support and to enhance the validity of the study. The study relied on multiple
sources of evidence to increase validity (i.e., document analysis of information security policies,
procedures, and standards). A copy of the interview notes was disseminated to the participants for
confirmation. Transferability was achieved by means of ‘thick description’ by attaining a richer
understanding of the context via the background information and document analysis of the policies. The
applicability of the research instruments was thoroughly linked with existing standards and extant
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literature for standardization. Dependability was achieved via maintaining an audit trail. This was
achieved by maintaining a list of data records, initially in paper format, and thereafter transferred to a
digital format. Confirmability implies maintaining objectivity and neutrality. The neutrality of the study
was achieved by assigning research assistants and data collectors in some instances to eliminate biases.
The data for the interview guide was collected both via email and face-to-face. The responses were
collected in Amharic and translated into English. The collected data was analyzed quantitatively and
qualitatively, case by case, through frequent comparison and inductive analysis based on preformatted
themes (Mabuza et al., 2014).
RESEARCH ANALYSIS
Profile of the Sample
A profile of organizations included in the study are summarized in Table 2. The study involved 32
participants’ accounts of ISIM practices. The sample consisted of – information security managers (n =
6), information security experts (n = 7), operational managers (n = 5), information security IT auditors
(n = 4), information security risk analysis officers (n = 3), and end-users (n = 7). Most of the respondents
from the sample have a basic level of education and a first degree commensurate with their positions
within the organization. All the organizations indicated that they utilize basic information security
mechanisms.
Code

Type

Function

Category

Size

No

ORG A

Government

Aviation

Commercial

>8000

6

ORG B

Government

Financial

Commercial

>10, 000

4

ORG C

Private

Financial

Commercial

>300

5

ORG D

Government

Media

Corporate

>1500

5

ORG E

Private

Financial

Commercial

>1500

5

ORG F

Government

Technology

Agency

>2500

7
32

TOTAL
Table 2. Background and Characteristics of the Organizations

Empirical Results and Analysis
In terms of the coordination of awareness efforts prescribed in the various policy documents, it was
found that a large proportion of the awareness efforts are geared toward account usage (i.e.,
authentication) and antivirus installations. The coordination of awareness efforts of security incident
handling and risk awareness were less integrated in policy documents as compared with the other
aspects of information security. The responses are summarized in Table 3 (Question Q1.5).
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Integrated Aspects
Security Incident Handling
Risk Awareness
Account Usage
Internet Application
Software Installation
Antivirus Installation

Number
10
9
29
25
20
29

Percentage
31.25
28.13
90.63
78.13
62.50
90.63

Table 3. Aspects of Information Security Awareness Issues Addressed in Organizations

Based on the responses, it was surmised that only ORG A and ORG B have a specific ISIM policy
document (question Q1.6). ORG C from the private sector has a general information security policy
document. The balance of the organizations are either in the process of developing a working policy
document or they do not have a policy document in place. Most of the respondents (81%) confirmed that
information security policies are drafted by information security experts and are then forwarded to
middle management for approval. Notably, government organizations tend to have their own ISIM
policy document and private organizations are in the process of developing a policy document.
Based on the responses related to the roles and responsibilities of management in ISIM, it was
established that five organizations (ORGs A, B, D, E and F) are guided by the Ethiopian Information
Network Security Agency (INSA) regarding information security policies (questions Q2.1 - Q2.3). In all
cases, the security personnel develop the security policies, while management ensures its approval.
INSA is involved in the process of initiating information security structures and guidelines in all
governmental organizations and some private organizations.
Evidently, the communication efforts by managers are largely underwhelming (question Q2.4). The use
of standards is sporadic, as it was revealed that only one organization (ORG A) from the government
sector is on track to comply with the ISO 27035 standard (questions Q2.5, Q2.6 and Q2.7). Most of the
participants (94%) indicated that the application of information security standards in their organizations
is at the initial planning stage. The participants indicated that the slow adoption of standards is due to a
lack of awareness about the existence of such standards. Furthermore, the participants indicated that the
adoption of standards would not have relevance for their organizational information security incident
operations. The following reason was offered by participant number three (an information security
manager): “However, Lack [sic] of adequate knowledge on the availability of information security
standards issues and lack of management commitment to use the existing standards are the factors which
have been hindering our organization to adapt the standards.” There also was no evidence suggesting the
application of specific workflows for ISIM processes (questions Q2.12 and Q2.13).
The application of formal agreements with employees concerning information security policies is
marginal (questions Q2.8 and Q2.9). The lack of formal agreements is generally attributed to the lack of
awareness of incident management. The responses to question Q2.10, which required the participants to
assess their organizations’ formal provisions with respect to ISIM processes, are summarized in Figure
2. “Incident response” appears to be the most formalized action while “incident assessment and
analysis” is the least formalized action.
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6

I N F O R M A T I O N S EC U R I T Y P O LI C Y

6
13

C O M M U N I C A T I O N & R EP O R T I N G

INCIDENT PROCESSES

2

14

15

R ES P O N S E

7

I D EN T I F I C A T I O N / D ET E C T I O N

Do they plan for it?

4
5

18

11

Does it have a formal document?

6

7

5

P R EP A R A T I O N & D EF I N I T I O N

15

18
6

7
9

3

15
6

A S S ES S M EN T & A N A LYS I S

2

13

11

A W A R EN ES S

10

5

28

Is it supported by ICT systems?

Is it supported by Decision Makers?

Figure 2. Responses across ISIM Parameters

The responses to question Q2.11, which required the participants to rate the level of information security
incident awareness and risk understanding of employees with respect to information security incident
awareness indicators, is summarized in Table 4.
Top-Level
Management

Middle-Level
Management

Low-Level
Management

End-Users

Information
Security
Expert
(ISIRT)

Knowledge about ICT systems
and components

1.9

3.12

3.1

2.1

5

Information security competence

1.2

2

3.4

1.1

5.8

Reporting security incidents

1.1

2.8

2.3

0.9

5.7

Up-to-date knowledge about
relevant threats

0.9

2.7

1.9

1.8

4.1

Learning from previous incidents

3.9

4.2

2.9

3.7

5.8

Awareness indicators

Table 4. An ISIM Awareness Assessment Indicators Matrix

The ISIM awareness assessment indicators matrix was derived by the respondents scoring each indicator
from Poor to Excellent, and these were encoded into Likert scales (1 to 6 respectively) for analysis. Each
management category was given a mean score to represent the overall response per category. Although
the general awareness quota is low, the rate of awareness is much higher among ICT experts.
Most of the techniques employed by organizations to raise the awareness of information security
incidents have been implemented via “promotional,” “educational,” and “informational methods”
(question Q2.14). The information security incident awareness raising methods, as utilized by the
organizations, is summarized in Table 5. Punitive measures, such as penalties and accountability, are not
given due consideration by the organizations under study.
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Awareness raising methods

ORG A

ORG B

ORG C

ORG D

ORG E

ORG F

Promotional methods

√

√

√

√

√

√

Enforcing methods

√

X

X

X

X

√

Educational methods

√

√

√

√

√

√

Informational methods (i.e.
updates on information security)

√

√

√

√

√

√

Digital methods

X

X

X

X

X

√

Face-to-face guidance methods

√

√

X

√

X

√

Table 5. ISIM Awareness Raising Methods per Organization

Most of the organizations used manual means of reporting information security incidents (question
Q 2.15). The usage per reporting mechanism is as follows – manual reporting (93.75%), face-to-face
contact (62.50%), electronic means (46.88%), telephone reporting (43.75%), audio-visual means
(21.88%), and customized application software (15.63%).
The level of an employee’s communication experience with respect to ISIM was found to be at a very
poor or fair level among all managerial levels, except among the experts (question Q2.16). This implies
that peer and vertical communication among users and managers was poor compared with peer
communication among expert users.
The frequency of communication regarding information security incidents is largely uncoordinated.
Most of the respondents (40.6%) indicated that information security incident communication efforts
(both peer-to-peer and laterally) are conducted usually when an incident arises (question Q 2.17). Figure
3 shows the percentage of frequency of information security incident communication in the studied
organizations. Case in point: “I usually communicate among ourselves and security personnel when
incident arises on how to protect and mitigate current security issues without using any formal means of
information security communication mechanism [sic],” (Participant No. 11)

Figure 3. Percentage Frequency of ISIM Communication within the Studied Organizations
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The communication and reporting efforts of information security incidents is largely uncoordinated. It
was established that most organizations usually communicate via short face-to-face meetings (question
Q2.18). Only two organizations (ORGs A and B) coordinated communication efforts through electronic
means. A case in point: “The routine information security cases are not communicated to the operational
staff, whereas the filtered or analyzed information is not reported to decision makers. We were also
rarely communicated about information security incidents that were believed to be critical by the ICT
staff and experts” [sic] (Participant No. 17).
An inspection of the opinions regarding the methods that can be used to improve the awareness and
communication efforts among stakeholders revealed that the majority of respondents (91%) opted for
policy change, training, and a coordinated incident reporting and awareness effort (question Q2.19).
An examination of the responses concerning the types of challenges involved in the coordination of
communication and awareness efforts in ISIM revealed the following challenges – lack of planning,
policies, awareness and managerial commitment, and no established center for information security
training (question Q2.20).
The respondents offered the following recommendations with respect to the manner ISIM
communication efforts can be integrated effectively into an organizational information security policy
(question #Q2.21) – integration of reporting policies on ISIM; proactive reporting of information
security incidents; enhancing the awareness of ISIM; strong managerial commitment; enforcing
automated security incident communication policy and procedure; stronger linkage between an
organization’s information security team and public relations; benchmarking of information security
standards; building an information security knowledge base, and the deployment of a skilled information
security incident response team (ISIRT).
Apparently, there is scant involvement of end-users both in the process of information security incident
policy formulation, implementation, and communication efforts (questions Q3.1 –Q3.4). The security
experts prepare awareness documents for employees, and awareness training is provided by security
experts with the support of mid-level management. However, most end-users did not get an invitation to
participate in information security policy formulation and incident preparation. The reasons cited for the
lack of involvement of end-users include confidentiality, work overload, and the lack of expertise in
information security. Only two organizations (ORGs A and B) have initial trials involving end-users in
the process of information security incident policy formulation. These organizations provided
consultative training for their end-users. Moreover, a fair balance of routine work and the information
security awareness scheme was implemented among these organizations.
The accounts of end-user involvement in information security incident cases revealed that most
respondents (57.14%) are highly involved in high-level policy issues as opposed to technical and
security issues (question Q3.5). The data extracted from Part II of the interview guide confirmed the
status of the involvement of end-users in ISIM. The excluded end-users indicated that they would prefer
to be consulted in such matters for shared understanding and for upskilling. One end-user indicated that
such involvement would not only have been to the benefit of himself but also to the benefit of the
organization. Case in point: “It would have been very good if our organization would have provided me
the opportunity to participate in information security issues that concern us to the benefit of the
organization” (End-User No. 3, ORG A). The following case in point also establishes the need for enduser involvement in ISIM: “I think it will be good if the organization frequently and consistently
practice information security training and awareness to all employees irrespective of their position and
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role. And we also need a computer based system that alarms us that we are under threat or to aware us
[sic]” (End User No. 4, ORG C). Evidently end-users would prefer to be involved in ISIM.
As most of the organizations did not have a standardized information security incident management
policy document, the study considered related documents, such as ICT Policy, Information Management
Policy, and User Management Policy, to confirm the responses of the participants.
DISCUSSION
Some of the challenges observed in this research are echoed in published academic work. For instance,
lack of managerial commitment, lack of collaboration, and lack of documentation are known weaknesses
in ISIM (Bartnes et al., 2016a). With respect to the first minor research question (RQ-1), it was found
that the coordination of communication and awareness efforts are largely informal and are mired by a
lack of planning and managerial commitment; however, there was a drive toward including ISIM in
policy documents. The findings of this study are also comparable to Yohannes et al. (2019). In their case
study on an Ethiopian bank, they also found that there is a lack of mechanisms to report incidents. They
also note that some incidents go unreported due to poor communication efforts.
The importance of coordination between external and internal stakeholders with respect to incident
reporting was also highlighted by extant studies (Hove et al., 2014). However, as reflected by Bartnes et
al. (2016a) and Tøndel et al. (2014), the collaboration among stakeholders in incident reporting remains
a challenge. This finding is also comparable with this study. Furthermore, with respect to the minor
question (RQ-2), it was found that while end-users would prefer to be involved in ISIM, the import of
their contribution is largely ignored in the process. Consequently, most end-users have a scant awareness
of ISIM and the reporting process. This paper proposes that involving end-users in ISIM can reduce the
number and severity of information security incidents. First, the involvement of end-users in ISIM may
prevent accidental and malicious insider threats, as end-users cannot use the excuse of being ignorant of
which actions constitute an information security breach. Second, end-users will be able to identify and
report an incident more efficiently, thereby reducing the severity of the incident.
In the organizations studied from Ethiopia, the ISIM issue is a relatively new concept for most
organizations. The organizations studied are characterized by the absence of a strong ISIM policy
document and low levels of stakeholder participation, with an emphasis on responding to incidents (i.e.,
reactive) rather than an effective proactive strategy. This implies that Ethiopian organizations are highly
susceptible to information security incidents. Most of the organizations studied emphasized general
information security threats and technical security equipment installations. It has been recognized that
there is a need for a fair balance between prevention and response for an organization to proactively and
retroactively respond to incidents (Baskerville et al., 2014). The lack of plans and formal employee
collaboration in the process of information security incidents could pose a severe risk to organizations
(Tøndel et al., 2014; Werlinger et al., 2010). As a result, it cannot be overstated that organizations must
include proactive planning, resource allocation, and formal employee involvement in all phases of ISIM
(Ab Rahman & Choo, 2015).
The findings of this study imply that the coordination of awareness and communication efforts are
executed in a fragmented and disjointed manner. Werlinger et al. (2010) observed that most
organizations do not have the culture of working collaboratively with stakeholders and end-users,
especially in terms of setting and communicating information security incident policies. The findings of
this study also established that the culture of information security incident awareness and
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communication is largely absent. It can be reasoned that ISIM requires a reframing of awareness and
communication efforts into an inclusive process, which is the subject of the next section.
A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK
This study identified two key problems in ISIM – poor coordination of communication and awareness
efforts. These key problems negatively influence the reporting of incidents and the collaborative power
of groups acting in coordination, and this presents a major risk to organizations. These issues led the
study to unpack the final minor research question (i.e., how can organizations enhance the coordination
of communication and awareness efforts within the processes of ISIM practice?).
Most studies recommended training programs for awareness creation (Hove et al., 2014; Tøndel et al.,
2014; Yohannes et al., 2019). Based on the challenges identified in the exploratory study, a sociotechnical solution may be required to coordinate awareness efforts. ISIM will benefit from a sociotechnical solution to combat incident challenges proactively in organizations (Werlinger et al., 2010).
An alternative way of increasing awareness may be achieved through policy. Wiant (2005) suggested
that information policy may increase the awareness of incidents; however, this empirical study found
that policy does not influence the number and severity of incidents reported. Tøndel et al. (2014)
formulated a model of incident management based on a systematic review of the literature. In the model,
the “plan and prepare” phase catered for incident management awareness (via training) while the
“response” phase catered for communication efforts. They argued that an incident tracking system will
facilitate communication among technical staff. However, they contend that there is a lack of policies on
formal channels for communication. They suggested that incident ticketing systems require a shared
mental model to improve coordination of communication efforts. However, they could not verify the
process of a shared mental model; they felt that this may be the missing element in the information
required by technicians in incident ticketing systems. Entin and Entin (2000) surmised that mental
models create awareness and the accuracy and congruence of these models impact a team’s level of
Situational Awareness. Scarfone et al. (2008) argue that maintaining Situational Awareness in incident
management involves planning, documenting, and assigning roles and responsibilities. Therefore, the
process must be managed carefully, which may be the reason why this process is deficient in ISIM.
Webb et al. (2014) highlighted the relevance of Situational Awareness to information security in general
and specifically to information security risk management which share many of the problems with ISIM
– (1) information risk identification is perfunctory; (2) security risks are estimated without due attention
to situation awareness; and (3) risk assessments are done intermittently without attention to historical
data. In a previous study conducted by the current authors (Padayachee & Worku, 2017), the application
of Situational Awareness to ISIM was considered. As there are few descriptions of a Shared Situational
Awareness model for organizations, this model considered representations from other contexts, such as
supply chain management (Kurapati et al., 2013a; Kurapati et al., 2013b). The model developed by the
authors demonstrated that the process of incident management could iterate from individual Situational
Awareness to Shared Situational Awareness, thereby increasing the responsiveness and collaborative
power in the process. However, the model did not address the pathways of communication channels.
Linderoth et al. (2015, p. 321), who conducted a study within emergency situations which share a
similarity with ISIM, found that Situational Awareness, communication, and attitude were challenges
and they stated that effective communication pathways “are essential to obtain sufficient and identical
situation awareness.” The processes of incident preparation, detection, and reporting are crucial steps in
ISIM, which are followed by assessment, decision, response, and lessons learned (Humphreys, 2008).
Consequently, communication flow is a vital component of every step in cyber security incident
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response. The next elaboration aims to show a formalized approach to coordinating Situational
Awareness with communication pathways.
Situational Awareness
Situational Awareness is more than just being aware of “numerous pieces of data,” as it requires an
advanced level of situational understanding and a projection of future system states (Endsley, 1995).
Situational Awareness is the perception and comprehension of the elements in the current state and a
projection of their status into the near future state (Endsley, 1988), which requires a user’s ability to
understand, infer and make decisions proactively based on empirical information about a situation.
Figure 4 demonstrates an application of Situational Awareness to ISIM. (The application of Situational
Awareness to ISIM was developed by the authors, however, the basic elements of Situational Awareness
were adapted from Endsley (1995). Webb et al. (2014) argued that Situational Awareness is highly
suitable to organizational process design.

Figure 4. Levels of Situational Awareness for Information Security Incident Management

Situational Awareness could have a potential role in understanding, perceiving, and anticipating future
incidents so that active incidents are addressed proactively. According to Barford et al. (2010), there are
seven aspects of Situational Awareness which can be applied to incident management, which were also
explored in a previous work by the authors of the current paper (Padayachee and Worku, 2017): (1)
awareness of the current situation which includes situation recognition (knowing that an attack is
occurring) and identification (i.e., type of attack), the source (who, what) and target; (2) awareness of
the impact of the attack (impact assessment, vulnerability analysis), which includes current impact and
future assessment; (3) situation tracking; (4) awareness of the adversary’s behavior, trends, and intent
analysis; (5) awareness of why and how the current situation was caused; (6) awareness of the
trustworthiness of the collected situation awareness data; (7) projecting and constraining future actions
from the adversary, whereby, the constraint involves understanding intent, opportunity, and capability.
Moreover, a multi-actor activity like ISIM should be subsumed in a Shared Situational Awareness
framework. According to Endsley and Jones (2001, p. 48), Shared Situational Awareness is defined as
“the degree to which team members possess the same SA (Situational Awareness) on shared SA
(Situational Awareness) requirements.” Shared Situational Awareness, which is more appropriate to
organizational settings, involves “a number of persons trying to form a common picture” (Nofi, 2000, p.
28).
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Figure 5. Communication Pathways to Achieve Shared Situational Awareness for ISIM

The relationship between Shared Situational Awareness and socio-technical systems has not been
thoroughly explored (Kurapati et al., 2012). Nofi (2000) suggests that building Shared Situational
Awareness within organizations involves the following criteria: first, consider the individual Situational
Awareness within the framework of what needs to be accomplished. Second, establish roles of other
members of the organization to share their awareness appropriately (mental models) by using a
communication protocol. Third, integrate various individual mental models of the situation to develop a
common understanding. In this modification of the “Conceptual Model for Shared Situational
Awareness for Information Security Incident Management,” the authors leverage communication
pathways to address this deficiency in the original conceptualization (see Figure 5). The notion of a
communication protocol within Situational Awareness was adapted from Linderoth et al. (2015);
however, the application to ISIM was developed by the authors.
In Figure 5, the user detects an incident and will need to report the incident. The user will report it
according to his/her perception of the elements involved in the incident detected; for example, the type
of attack, and the source and target of the attack. Based on his/her perceptions and comprehension of the
current situation, the user also will create a projection of future incidents. The user will then
communicate his/her report to the ISIRT team who will interpret and analyze the report. Using this
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information and additional tools (e.g., impact assessment and vulnerability analysis) and their
perceptions and comprehension of the current situation, the ISIRT team will also conduct a projection of
future incidents in order to plan and prepare for managing future incidents and lessons learned. This will
be an internal communication between the ISIRT team members. The ISIRT team will communicate
assessments and decisions to the wider stakeholders. In the next sub-section, the communication
protocol for the conceptual model is explored in further detail.
An Interactive Model of Communication for ISIM
In general terms, “[c]ommunication implies a sender, a channel, a message, a receiver, a relationship
between sender and receiver, an effect, a context in which communication occurs and a range of things
to which ‘messages’ refer” (McQuail & Windahl, 2015, p. 5). According to Sellnow (2005), there are
three basic communication models – the linear model, the interactive model, and the transactional
model. The linear model views communication as one-directional, while the interactive model is
bidirectional. The transactional model is more advanced than the interactive model, as it also considers
the context of the communication which may influence the interaction, such as culture. However, the
transactional model encourages non-verbal cues and “noise” as communication between senders and
receivers occurs simultaneously (Businesstopia, 2018). The interactive model, more specifically, the
Interactive Model of Communication (IMC) was chosen for this study, as it is often used for the Internet
where people can respond to mass communication (Businesstopia, 2018). Additionally, it is beyond the
scope of this research to consider the cultural and societal issues that may affect communication.
Communication models have been applied within ICT settings (Madida, 2018; Moise, 2008; Velten &
Arif, 2016). However, there appears to be few instances of its application to incident management, with
the exception of Valecha et al. (2012).
Valecha et al. (2012) used IMC in order to standardize emergency communication reports. They
developed a messaging model which determines the structure of a message and standardizes the format
so that it could be shared with several departments. They used the model to identify key elements and
state transitions in emergency communications. They indicate that their work could be extended to
information management, coordination, and accountability. However, this study will propose using the
communication model within the context of Situational Awareness.
The underlying rationale in applying a communication model, such as the IMC (see Figure 6), is to
enhance the communication of information security incidents, policies, and procedures in a coordinated
manner. The model deals with the exchange of information and messages taking place bi-directionally
from sender to receiver and vice-versa (Schramm, 1954). The IMC takes into account the
communicators’ fields of experience – the greater that their field of experience overlaps, the greater the
understanding between the communicators (Wood, 2014). The concept of a shared understanding
appears to be congruent with Shared Situational Awareness. Successful application of the IMC model in
incident management is also shaped by the technical abilities and communication skills of both the
sender and the receiver, and this is known as the field of experience. There also may be interferences to
communication such as process, physical, semantic, and psychosocial barriers (Lunenburg, 2010). It is
beyond the scope of this research to consider these interferences. The model will facilitate the
management and exchange of information among stakeholders regarding encountered incidents, which
can potentially answer the “What,” “When,” and “Who” aspect of the incident. In the next elaboration,
an application of the concept is unpacked.
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Figure 6. Interactive Model of Communication
(adapted from Schramm, 1954).

Application of the Conceptual Model
Figure 7 shows the application of using IMC and Situational Awareness in ISIM within a role-based
system.

Figure 7. An Application of the Conceptual Model

This application of the conceptual framework focuses on the phases of “Detection and Reporting” and
“Response,” as there is poor communication between reporting the incident and the notification back to
the users regarding the response. The user detects an incident within the field of experience (based on
prior planning and preparation and lessons learned from previous incidents) and needs to decode the
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incident. The user needs to formally document (encode) the incident. The user will encode the incident
according to his/her perception of the elements involved in the incident detected; for example, the type
of attack, and the source and the target of the attack. Based on his/her perceptions and comprehension of
the current situation, the user also will create a projection of future incidents using specific codes and
data elements. The user then will upload his/her report to the ISIRT team, which will interpret and
analyze the information (i.e., decode) based on past incidents and lessons learned (i.e., their field of
experience). Using this information and additional tools (e.g., impact assessment and vulnerability
analysis) and perceptions and comprehension of the current situation, the ISIRT team will also encode a
projection of future incidents, which includes planning and preparation for managing future incidents
and lessons learned. They also will encode their assessment, response, and decisions regarding the
incident. They then will direct their assessment and decisions, which will be forwarded to all users based
on their roles. Each user then decodes the assessments and decision report and they will encode their
feedback (including a projection of future incidents) to the ISIRT team for verification. Table 6 shows
how the incident is managed within the conceptual framework. The model is intended to work in a rolebased system in order to manage multiple stakeholders.
Perception of the
elements in the
incident
Decode the new
Incident
Identify new
Incident

Comprehension of the
current situation

Projection of future
incidents

Output

Encode the
Incident
-Incident Source
-Incident Category
-Incident Risk
-Incident Target

Encode the Projection of
future incidents with the
support of additional enablers
such as situational, structural
and automated tools.

USER Report of
Incident

ISIRT

Decode report from
ISIRT

Encode the
Incident
-Register Incident
-Review Incident
-Verify Incident
-Analyze Incident
-Scale Incident
-Classify Incident
-Impact Assessment
-Vulnerability
Assessment
-Backtracking
-Filter Incident according
to roles

Encode the Projection of
future incidents. Plan and
Prepare for future incidents.
Lessons Learnt in preparation
for future incidents.

ISIRT Report
of the Incident

USER 1…N

Decode the ISIRT
Report according to
roles

Encode the ISIRT Report
according to roles

Encode the Projection of
future incidents based on the
collective information.

Submit
Verification of
Action to ISIRT

ROLE
USER
(the reporter of
the incident)

Table 6. An Application of the Conceptual Model
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CONCLUSION
This paper proposed a novel conceptual model to address the challenges identified by an empirical
study. The model potentially will leverage the collaborative power of bringing diverse stakeholders
together, including end-users via Shared Situational Awareness. The communication channels are
clearly outlined and provide a mechanism to develop a unified understanding of ISIM. Although this
study was exploratory with a limited sample size, it provides new empirical data on ISIM practices (with
respect to awareness and communication efforts) which appears to be congruent to other global research
studies. As the study was limited to organizations in Ethiopia, the findings may not be generalizable to
all contexts. The research approach for this study should be viewed within a framework of a design
science approach. The preliminary phases of a design science approach requires the identification and
description of a relevant problem (March & Storey, 2008) which was presented here. Future research
will involve prototyping and evaluating the conceptual model.
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APPENDIX A: INTERVIEW GUIDE
Note: The interview guide was designed to be conversational.
PART I: INTERVIEW QUESTIONS (EXPERTS ONLY)
Background
1.1. How many employees currently work in your organization?
1.2. To which of the following organizational categories does your organization belong?
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Specialization
□Education
□Service
□Health
□Military
□Technology
□Energy
□Local NGO
□International NGO
□Commercial
□Non-commercial
□
□
□
□

Organizational category
Government organization

Non-governmental organization
Private Sector
Corporate organization
Security organization
Public relations & Marketing
Other

1.3. Which of the following Information systems does your organization deploy and utilize?
□

Business and Commercial Information Systems

□

Customer Information Systems

□

Employee Management

□

Data and Information Security

□

National Security Systems

□

Telecom & Network systems

□

Other__________________________________

1.4.

Which of the following information security mechanisms does your organization utilize?

Information security mechanism
Technical Information Security

Physical Information security
System and Data Security
Non-Technical Information security
Other

Specific methods
□Antivirus and Anti-spyware
□Firewall
□Virtual private network
□Encryption & Decryption
□Intrusion and Detection System (IDS)
□Endpoint
□Backup and restore
□Wireless security
□Room
□Human security
□Hardware
□Systems and network security
□Business communications security
□Web and application security
□Security employee training and awareness
□Security policies and procedures
□Policy: Corporate security policy, password policy, hiring and disciplinary policy
□
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1.5. Which of the following aspects of information security awareness issues are addressed in your
organizational information security policy document?
□

Security incident handling

□

Risk awareness

□

Account usage (Username and Password)

□

Internet application (Email, Downloading, and social media utilization)

□

Software installation

□

Antivirus installation and usage

□

Other_________________________

1.6. Does your organization have a specific policy document on information security incident
management issues?
1.7. If your answer to the above question is ‘NO’, provide possible reasons for the lack of information
security and incident management policies?
2. Information security incident management
2.1. Which of the following role-players in your organization is assigned the responsibility of
developing incident management processes?
□

ICT office

□

Management or Executive body

□

National regulatory body

□

Organizational stakeholders

□

Other ____________________________

2.2. Which of the following management levels plays an active role in awareness and communication
regarding information security incident management?
□

Top-Level Management

□

Middle-Level Management

□

Low-Level Management

□

Not Applicable

2.3. Describe the role that management currently plays/should play in information security incident
awareness?
2.4. Describe the role that management currently plays/should play in information security incident
communication?
2.5. Which of the following standards does your organization, currently comply?
□

ISO/IEC 27001

□

ISO/IEC 27002 Standard
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□

ISO/IEC 27035 Standard

□

The ITIL Framework

□

NIST Special Publication 800-61

□

ENISA - Good Practice Guide for Incident Management

□

Nor SIS - Guideline for Incident Management

□

SANS: Incident Handler's Handbook

□

COBIT 5

□

ISMM

□

IEEE 802.11

□

Other __________________

2.6. If your organization uses any of the above information security management standards, how does
it implement this with respect to information security incident management processes?
2.7. If your organization does not apply any of the above information security incident management
standards, provide possible reasons for the lack of standard usage.
2.8. Does your organization have any formal agreement with employees regarding information security
incident management process issues?
□

Yes

□

No

2.9. If your answer to the above question is 'no', provide possible reasons for the lack of such agreement
between the organization and the employees.
2.10

Assess your organizations information security incident management processes

No

How does the organization manage the following
incident management processes?

1
2
3
4
5

Incident preparation and definition
Incident identification/detection
Incident assessment and analysis
Incident response
Incident awareness, understanding, anticipation and
knowledge of employees
Incident communication and reporting
Information security policy efficiency

6
7

Does it have a
formal
document?

Do they
plan for
it?

Is it
supported by
ICT systems?

Is it
supported by
Decision
Makers?

Risk understanding and identiﬁcation
2.11. Rate the level of information security incident awareness and risk understanding of employees
with respect to the following indicators? (Excellent, Very good, Good, Satisfactory, Fair, Poor)
No
1

Information security incident awareness
indicators
Knowledge about ICT system and

Top-Level
Mgt

MiddleLevel Mgt
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components
Information security competence
Reporting security incidents
Up-to-date knowledge about relevant
threats
Learning from previous incidents

2.12. Does your organization have a specific workflow for information security incident management
processes?
□

Yes

□

No

2.13. If you have answered 'YES' to the previous question, comment on the following aspects:
2.13.1. How is it prepared and maintained?
2.13.2. How is it communicated to the members of the incident management team?
2.14. Which of the following methods support managers in increasing awareness of information security
incident management policies in your organization?

1

Awareness raising
methods
□Promotional
methods

2

□Enforcing methods

3

□Educational
methods
□Informational
methods
□Digital methods

No

4
5
6

Description and specific tools
Screen savers, Banners on the intranet, Hyperlinks from the intranet homepage to the security
page, Articles in the internal publication, Posters, Puzzles and games, Pre-printed note pads or
sticky notes, T-shirts, Mugs and cups, Mouse pads, Stickers
Underwriting security principles, Confidentiality agreements, Required awareness exam or
test, Disciplinary actions for non-compliance, Inclusion in annual evaluations or, promotion
criteria, Rewarding mechanisms
Slide presentation, training, brief targeted session, Online learning module, Demonstration,
Video, Workshops
Leaflets, Short articles or news stories, Intranet security web site postings, E-mail warnings,
Information security guides, Tips-of-the-month, Flash cards, Newsletters
CD-ROM or DVD materials, simulated production, Audio-visual tools, Online methods,
Closed Circuit TV

□Face-toface guidance
method

Adapted from (Johnson, 2006)
2.15. Which of the following reporting mechanisms does your organization use to communicate with
staff about information security incidents?
□

Telephone reporting

□

Manual/paper-based reporting

□

Face-to-face contact or meeting

□

Electronic means (E-mail, Social media, Mobile phone)

□

Audio-visual/Multimedia format

□

Special software application for incident reporting
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Other_____________________________

2.16. How would you assess the level of an employee’s communication experience with respect to
information security incident management among different clusters of employees in your organization?
No
1
2
3
4
5

Employee Cluster
Top-Level management
Middle-Level management
Low-Level management
End-users
ICT Experts

Excellent

Very Good

Good

Satisfactory

Fair

Poor

2.17. How frequently does your organization communicate regarding information security incidents?
□

When an incident happens

□

Quarterly

□

Bi-annually

□

Weekly

□

Annually

□

Monthly

□

Other________________________

2.18. How does your organization communicate and report information security incidents to employees?
2.19. In your opinion, what should be done to improve the awareness and communication strategies
among employees and stakeholders in order to enhance information security incident management in
your organization?
2.20. What kind of challenges does your organization face regarding information security incident
communication and awareness cases?
2.21. In your opinion, how can communication with regard to information security incident management
be effectively integrated into your organizational information security policy?
3. Information Security Incident Management and End-users’ involvement
3.1. Identify the role and relation of the various stakeholders with regard to Information security incident
management issues in your organization.
Stakeholder
All staff members
Line management
Executive management and boards of directors
Field staff
Laptop users
IT department
IT help desk
System and/or data owners
E-mail users

Role
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Vendors and suppliers
Other_________________

3.2. Does your organization involve end-users in the process of information security incident awareness
and communication matters?
□

Yes

□

No

3.3. If your answer is 'YES’ to the above question, describe how your organization involves end-users in
the process of information security and incident management policy issues?
3.4. If your answer is ‘NO’ to question No 3.2, describe the reason why your organization does not
involve end-users in the process of information security policy awareness and communication matters.
3.5. Which information security incident cases, regarding end-users, are taken into account by the
organization?
□

All security cases

□

Only non-technical cases

□

Only technical cases

□

Some higher level policy issues

□

Other_________________________

PART II: INTERVIEW QUESTIONS (END-USERS ONLY)
Have you ever been involved in the setting of information incident security management guidelines in
your organization?
If your answer to the above question is 'YES', describe your level of participation.
Have you ever participated in an information security incident awareness program?
If your answer to the above question is ‘YES’, describe your role with regard to communication and
awareness aspects to improve information security incident management in your organization?
If your answer to the question 3 is 'NO', what should your organization put into practice in order to
involve end-users and stakeholders to improve awareness and communication?
In your opinion, how can your organization plan and prepare better information security management
through awareness and communication mechanisms?
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